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künftigen Forschungen jedoch in einer Weise problematisiert werden, wie dies schon für an-
dere Länder und Sprachgruppen geleistet worden ist.4 
Innsbruck  Martin Rohde
                                 
4  Zur Übersicht: MARIUS TURDA (Hrsg.): The History of East-Central European Eugen-
ics, 1900–1945. Sources and Commentaries, London et al. 2015. 
 
 
Lukáš Novotný: The British Legation in Prague. Perception of Czech-German Rela-
tions in Czechoslovakia between 1933 and 1938. De Gruyter Oldenbourg. Berlin 2019. 
284 S. ISBN 978-3-11-064711-2. (€ 99,95.)  
This monograph deals with the reporting of the British Legation in Prague on the issue 
of Czech-German relations in interwar Czechoslovakia and the reception of those reports 
in the Foreign Office. This topic has not yet been the subject of a book-length analysis, de-
spite serving as a background to the infamous Munich agreement of September 1938 and it 
deserves further exploration. To his credit, Lukáš N o v o t n ý  has used a range of archival 
material, including not just British and Czechoslovak but also German, Austrian and 
French documents. With this in view, it is a pity that he has not produced a more satisfac-
tory work. His book reads like a compilation of overlong and repetitive summaries of the 
reports coming from Prague rather than a structured analysis.   
N.’s argument is that the Sudeten German issue was ―a Czechoslovak internal affair in 
the eyes of the British Legation‖ (p. 181) until the pressures of the international situation, 
namely Nazi Germany’s expansionism, turned it into a danger with which the British Ca-
binet was increasingly concerned from late 1937 onwards. Thus, it was not before mid-
February 1938 that ―the idea of vast concessions by the Czechoslovak Government‖ to sa-
tisfy the demands of Konrad Henlein’s party (SdP) ―first manifested [itself] in the Lega-
tion’s considerations‖ (p. 185). This is entirely unconvincing. The Sudeten German area 
was, along with Austria and the Polish Corridor, one of the major spots in which resurgent 
Germany was expected to make trouble. The British had been concerned since the mid-
1930s that the Czechoslovak internal dispute would invite Germany’s interference and turn 
into another European-scale war given the existing defensive treaties between Czechoslo-
vakia and France (1925), Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, and France and the Soviet 
Union, concluded in 1935.   
Joseph Addison, Minister in Prague (1930–1936), spared no effort not just to vilify the 
Czechs for their treatment of the German minority, but also to present Czechoslovakia as 
an artificial and unviable country. His anti-Czech prejudices were striking, no less than his 
willingness to commit to paper his racist comments (even by the standard of that era). 
Charles Bentinck continued to reiterate the necessity of improving the lot of Sudeten Ger-
mans, but he stayed in Prague only briefly. Basil Newton replaced Bentinck and took a 
more balanced view (which N. fails to note). Newton admitted that the SdP was inclined 
towards totalitarianism and played Berlin’s game; since Germany was insincere in its 
declarations concerning the Sudeten Germans, it was possible to gain some ―breathing 
space‖ but not to make any lasting agreement. Despite his personal sympathies with the 
Czechs, Newton believed it would be better for the peace of Europe to encourage a shift 
from Czechoslovakia’s ―unstable equilibrium‖ to ―a position of natural stability,‖ even if 
that implied an infringement on the country’s independence.1 
But it was the Foreign Office that made policy. Its officials, especially Permanent Un-
der-Secretary Robert Vansittart, were convinced that Henlein was a moderate who voiced 
                                 
1 Newton to Sargent, 1937-11-22, in: The National Archives, Kew, R 7807/188/12, FO 
371/21132; also Newton to Eden, 1937-10-31, ibidem, R 7355/188/12, FO 371/21131; 
Newton to Foreign Office, 1938-03-15, ibidem, R 2755/162/12, FO 371/22337.  
 
 
legitimate German grievances and blamed Prague for not putting its house in order. They 
also discounted any possibility that Henlein was a tool of Berlin, and Vansittart even met 
him in London. Vansittart became disillusioned with Henlein no later than October 1937, 
when the Foreign Office obtained evidence of Germany’s funding of the SdP, of which N. 
makes no mention. Perhaps the author overlooked the importance of that discovery be-
cause it brought about no visible change in British policy. But the underlying reasons for 
the continued advocacy of an improvement in the status of the German minority were 
largely a matter of handling the Third Reich: Vansittart wanted to strip the Germans of 
their excuse for meddling in Czechoslovakia’s affairs and buy some time in the process.2 
This was part of his policy recommendations for the purpose of containing Germany, since 
he thought, unlike many of his colleagues, that German hegemony over Central Europe 
would endanger Britain’s security. He and Orme Sargent, Assistant Under-Secretary, pro-
posed to do for Czechoslovakia what Britain had done for Austria—to express interest for 
the independence of that country, even if that was no more than ―a judicious bluff.‖3 Ulti-
mately, it was Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s taking control over foreign policy 
that militated against any attempt to support Prague diplomatically. As Britain could not 
intervene in Berlin without being snubbed, it exerted pressure on Edvard Beneš to grant 
concessions, and eventually full autonomy, to the Germans. The nature of a settlement was 
of no importance; it was all about preventing Germany from going to war for the alleged 
protection of Sudeten Germans. 
None of these crucial developments are explained in N.’s exegesis. He does not engage 
with the vast literature on British foreign policy and the Foreign Office, or with the more 
modest number of works relating to his specific theme. It is telling that he refers (just a 
few times) to Ph.D. theses rather than published monographs by Gábor Bátonyi, Michael 
Roi and the reviewer. He also displays a strange confusion with respect to the position of 
important individuals within the British establishment. For example, Sargent was not a 
―British politician‖ and Vansittart was not ―the second highest official in the Foreign 
Office‖ (p. 119). Moreover, N.’s references do not fit with any standard convention, while 
the main text is replete with atrocious errors of grammar, spelling and syntax, and with 
missing words and quotation marks, which at times make it extremely difficult to grasp the 
meaning. The book should not have been published in such a poor state.     
Beograd Dragan Bakić
                                 
2 Vansittart minute, 1937-01-14, ibidem, R 133/133/12, FO 371/21125. 
3 Sargent memorandum ―Problem of Czechoslovakia,‖ 1937-01-11, ibidem, R 622/188/ 
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This edited volume is a collection of 16 papers that were originally presented at an in-
ternational conference in Warsaw in 2015. The goal of the conference was to demonstrate 
through historical analyses of multiple case studies how two seemingly separate spheres of 
justice—political and transitional—can intertwine and become difficult to distinguish from 
one another. Transitional justice, encompassing legal processes of prosecuting and pun-
ishing for crimes committed by a previous regime, becomes entangled with political justice 
when these legal processes start being employed for political purposes. The convergence 
of political and transitional justice is the central theme tying all chapters together. 
In the introduction, editors Magnus B r e c h t k e n , Władysław B u ł h a k  and Jürgen 
Z a r u s k y  present three institutions whose close research collaboration led to the publica-
tion of the volume: the Leibniz Institute for Contemporary History in Germany, the Insti-
